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Among  economists, t is generally  taken as given  The relative  efficiency  of incentive-  and
that environmental  regulation  based on the use of  market-based  regulation  depends  on the specific
economic  incentives  and the competitive  market  nature  of the activity  to be regulated.  In some
will  be more efficient  (attain  the same environ-  cases it may be greatly superior  to command-
mental  goal at lower social cost) than traditional  and-control  regulation;  in others, only marginally
command-and-control  approaches  represented  by  so. Moreover,  to be effective,  incentive-based
environmental  regulations  in the United  States  regulation  may require  greater effort  for monitor-
and to a lesser extent the European  Community.  ing and enforcement  - effort  that offsets  gains
The sulfur trading  provision  of the recent amend-  in efficiency.  So the choice of regulatory  ap-
ments  to the U.S. Clean Air Act suggests  that  proach  is not always clear cut, and some analyti-
some attention  is being  paid to economists'  cal means  of distinguishing  between  options  is
claims, but it would  be unrealistic  to assume  that  required.
the command-and-control  structure  of U.S.
environmental  policy  will be displaced  by  Kopp  reviews and recommends  a modeiing
economic  incentives  any time soon.  platform  for analyzing  regulations  designed  to
control point  source emissions.  The platform  is
While incentive-  and market-based  regula-  intended  to provide quantitative  information  on
tion  may have penetrated  very little in the United  the efficiency  of several  alternative  incentive-
States,  their potential  use for enviromnental  based, market-oriented,  and command-and-
improvement  in the rapidly  developing  countries  control regulatory  policies  might adopt  rapidly
of the Pacific Rim and the transitional  economies  developing  and transitional  economies.  In
of Eastern  Europe  and the Commonwealth  may  addition  to discussing  the model, Kopp  pays
be great. These  countries  have no history of  considerable  attention  to such a model's infor-
command-and-control  regulation  of the environ-  mational  requirements  and to techniques  for
ment and the relative  efficiency  of regulation  dealing  with inadequate  data.
may be important  to their capital-constrained
economies.
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Raymond J.  Kopp
L  INTRODUCTION  AND STATEMENT  OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this study is to identify the best modeling  platform  for the analysis  of
altemative  environmental  policy instruments  designed  to reduce  the emission  of pollutants  from
point sources, most notably, central power generating stations and manufacturing  facilities. 2
The primary analysis of concern is a cost-effectiveness  investigation  of the poUcy;  where for
the most par,  the cost of compliance  is a mulddimensional  variable  that includes the private
costs incurred  by the owners of the facility,  measures  of the change in the cost of providing
the facility's product,  and estimates  of the change in facility  capacity  factors  (i.e., measures  of
unemployed  resources). 3 The range of pollutants  under consideration  include the usual menu
of  air- and waterborne  emissions as well as  solid and liquid wastes finding their way to
landfdlls  and other such disposal  options (i.e., incineration). The range of policies  considered
tThe helpful  comments  of Shantayanan  Devarajan, uwmar skeland, Emmanuel  runenez,  Alan 1. Krupnick.  and
LiiH  LiAu  are gratefully  acknowledged;  however,  aU  effrors  and omissions  are the sole responsibility  of the author.
2The term modeling  platform is not rigorously  defined, but it is meant to be suggestive  of the underlying
theoreical and empirical  structure  of a model. For example,  two platforms  that are candidates  for the types of
analyses  we want to consider  are the engineering  process  model  platform  and the econometric  platform. These
types of models differ in terms of both concept and empirical  content.  The econometric  model postulates
optimizing  behavior  on the part of economic  agents  and analyzes  policies  by simulation,  while the engineering
process  model  says nothing  about actual behavior  and examines  policies  by explicit  optimization  of a specified
objective. The econometric  model  relies  on past behavioral  obsevation  and statistical  estimation  to parameterie
the modeL  while the process  model  relies on generally  accepted  physical  and engineering  relations. Platforms
cam  also be thought  of as having  a nested  hierarchy. For example,  under the econometric  platform  heading  one
might find production,  cost, or profit function  models. Each  of these shares  the same paradigm  underlying  all
econometric  models,  but differs  with regard  to assumptions  concening the objectives  of the economic  agents.
3Cost-effecdveness  implies that each of two competing  policies  produces  the same  environmental  results but a
differing  cost.  However,  we will not constrain  ourselves  to this type of analysis  and wil certainly  want to
consider  platformn  that permit  the evaluadon  of cost and emission  reductions  simultaneously.-2-
include: (1) tariffs on the emission  of pollutants,  (2)  tariffs and subsidies  applied to the inputs
or  the outputs of the point source activities under consideration,  (3) limits on the pollutant
emissions themselves, and (4) directives regarding the installation of particular equipment
and/or the alteradon  of process activities. 4
It  is important  to note at the outset the difficulty  of the task we are asking candidate
model platforms to perform.  We are concemed  with policies that can alter every price the
firm faces, alter the firm's ability to  dispose of waste, and require the firm to undertake
costly investments  in abatement  and treatment activides.  Compare  this analysis to the types
of analyses that were undertakeii  during the heydays  of the energy crisis when the modeling
of manufacturing  activity reached its zenith both in terms of effort levels and intellectual
contributions. In these analyses  the only variables  of concem  were energy  prices, and the big
issue being addressed was the relationships  between energy and capital. 5 The analyses we
wish to consider will build on  this early intellectual base, but must broaden the base to
encompass  an enormous  amount  of additional  complexity.
Everyone who attempts to construct an empirical model for the analysis of public
policies faces a common dilemma.  It  is invariably the case that the degree of  model
sophistication,  complication  and detail called for by the nature of the policy to be analyzed,
exceeds  the  data  available  for the  empirical parameterization of  the  model.  Among
economists,  the majority  response  to this problem  has been to simplify  and aggregate  until the
model has few enough parameters  that it can be estimated  with the scant available  data.
4We note that the policies identified  in (1) are broad enough to include tradable  permits and deposit refund
systams.
SWe are obviously  oversimplifying  the energy  demand  research  that was undertaken  during  the 1970s and early
1980s, but the fact remains  that in terms of complexity,  the task we have before us is at least an order of
mantude  gre.-3-
There are two explanations for this majority response.  The first view assumes that data
suitable for  model parameterization must come from published government dme series  (e.g.,
the  national  income  and  product  accounts)  or  cross-sectional  surveys  (e.g.,  household
consumpdon surveys and plant level manufacturing surveys).  It is hard to  pinpoint the origin
of  this predilection among economists, but it indicates a strong preference for data that come
from past historical experience and actual observadon.  Since such data are very expensive to
collect, they are always in short supply and rarely in the form suitable for model esdmadon.
The second reason is somewhat more sophisticated than the first and does not rely on simple
preference.  It  implicitly assumes that the errors one makes in the evaluation of  a policy are
greater if  one  relies on  low confidence data than the errors one  would make by simplifying
the  policy  model.6 Unfortunately,  few  empirical  studies  exist  to  support  this  view.7
However,  in  the  early  1980s Kopp  and  Smith initiated  a  series  of  such investigations  of
models  for  manufacturing  behavior  using  an  experimental technique.8 These  experiments
focused on input aggregation, constraints on the  firm (e.g., polludon control regulations) and
technological progress.  Generally speaking, our results suggested that highly simplified models
not  only  produced noninformative  (statistically  imprecise) estimates  of  important physical
relationships, but  often produced statisdcally significant estimates of  productdon features that
were simply false.  This experience has led me to  adopt the minority view when it comes to
model  and  data  tradeoffs.  Simply  stated,  it  is  my  opinion  that  it  is  better  to  use  low
6Low confidence data can be defined by an example.  Suppose I wanted to know the mean height of all
students  in a particular  class.  I could bring each student  up to the front of the class and measure  them and
then calculate the mean.  My confidence in the mean would be quite high and moderated  only by my
confidence  in the mechanics  of my height  measurement  method  to which I might assign an error of plus or
mnius  .25 inches. On the other hand, I could simply  look at the class and guess at the meaL  My confidence
in this case might be low and I may believe  that I could be off by as much as 6 inches. The only  difference
between  these  data is the confidence  (error  bounds)  that I would  assign  to the estimates.
7If the information  existed  to estimate  the full model no one would  care to estimate  some  lesser version.
8See Kom and Smith (1980a.  1980b,  1982.  1983,  1984).-4-
confidence data than a model that has been overly simplified through the use of restrictive
assumptions  (e.g.. those necessary to support aggregadon).
The remainder of  this  paper  is organized as  follows.  In  section  II  we discuss a
nonexhaustive set  of  issues associated with  the modeling of  point source  emissions and
policies for their control.  Given the state of our theoretical and empirical knowledge,  some
of these issues will be addressed by the modeling platforms we consider, but some of them
will simply outstrip our current intellectual capital and are topics for research.  Section m
introduces the restricted profit function as a  modeling platform, and discusses the usefulness
of the restricted  profit function in the analysis of environmental  policy.  In the closing section
we examine informational requirements.  The section proposes criteria for  evaluating the
adequacy of  available data  sets, discusses types of data  commonly found, and  considers
options for dealing with data inadequacies.
IL  COMPLEXITIES IN MODELING POINT SOURCES
11.1  Multiplicity of Inputs  and  Outputs
We postulate  that  the  point sources we  wish to  investigate  are plants engaged in
anthropogenic production of marketed goods or services.  Each point source is assumed to
produce at least  one such good or  service and most likely produces several.  We further
postulate that each point source employs two or more inputs  and  that the input list may
include both anthropogenic  and biogenic inputs.  Fmally, each point source produces a set of
residual products. 9
9This paper  cmploys  specific  definitions  for some  commonly  used  and not  so commonly  used terms. These  definitdons  n
provided below.
Productlon - An activity that serves  to transform  energy  and mater into altemative  forms  of emrgy and
(Foowote  9 continued  on following  page)II2  Jolntness of Production
At  the most geneml level,  he  production of goods, services, and residuals is considered
to  be  fully joint.  The  realization among economists that  the first  law of  thermodynamics
Intimately links inputs, outputs and residuals in a  rather complex and most often joint manner
is  due  to  Ayres  and  Kneese  (1969).  Technically  speaking, jointness  means  that:  (1) the
marginal cost  of producing any  particular good or service is  not independent of the level of
production  of  all  other  ge  ds,  services, or  residual products,  and  (2) the  marginal rate  of
transformation (MRT) between any two goods, services, or .s  ''s,  or  the MRT between a
good or service  and a  residual, is  not independent of  the levels of all other goods, services,
or  residuals.  In nontechnical terms this means that the cost of  producing an  additional unit
of  any  particular  good  will vary  with  the  level  of  production of  all  other goods  and  the
amounts of  residuals produced.  Joint production is the most  general case of the neoclassical
AnthroMoaenic  Production  - A production activity that is under the control of humans.  e.g., electricity
producdon,  textile  manufacture,  etc.
Plant  - The site at which anthropogenic production takes place, a term to characterize the totality of
integrated  production  acdvities.
Blozenic Production  - A production activity that occurs naturally, e.g.. the production of salt water
comnnercial  and game  fish by off-shore ocean fisheries, or the purification of surface water supplies performed by
wetlands.
Goods and Services -Outputs  of anthropogenic  or biogenic  production  activities  that generate  positive  utility
for individuals  when individuals  are provided  access  to them.
Market Goods and  Services -Goods  and services  that are exchanged  in organized  markets. The feature  that
enables  them to be "marketed"  is the ability  to provide  individuals  with  exclusive  ac-ss  to the good or service. Thus the
marketed good or service can only generate utility for those individuals  granted access. Such goods are often termed
private  goods and are generally  provided  by anthropogenic  pr4ducdon.
Input -A form of matter  or energy  that is transformed  during  the producdon  activity  or that provides  services
to facilitate  the ttasformaon.
Anthroposenkc Inputs -Inputs  of human labor  service,  inputs  of producible  market  goods and services,  and
Uiputs  of producible capital service.
Blogenle Inputs -Inputs of nonmarket  goods and serviee,  inputs of primary  energy forms (either market  or
nomnarket, e.g., coal and solar energy), inputs of animate and inanimate natural resources (e.g., plants and animals
provided  by biogenic  production,  and elemental  and mineral  resources).
Residual Products - Outputs  from anthropogenic  production  activities  that do not enhance  individual  utility
re taee residual  products. Residual  products  can also be defined  in a materials  balane  sense  as the residual  difference
between the matter and energy inputs that are input to the production activities and the matter and energy that are
enbodied  in ue  produced marketed goods and services. Whether items are  classified as residual products, inputs or
mkted  goods  and services  depends  upon market  conditions.  For  example,  at a given set of market  prices,  spent sulfuric
acid  used in metal cleaing  is a residual product, while at higher  prices for sulfuric acid the spent acid is recycled and
becomes  an input  or is sold  to others and becomes  a market  good.*6-
production model.  Examples of  nonjoint production are simply special cases of the general
joint  production characterization  described above.
II.3  Input  and  Output  Substitutability  and  Complementarity
Substitution among inputs  and outputs is  the normal assumption in  simple production
models  and  indeed  the  only  possibility  when  inputs  and  outputs  are limited  to  two  each.
However, in  more complex models, where inputs  and outputs exceed  two, input and output
complementarity is  possible.  Complementarity on the input side  suggests, holding the output
vector constant, that a decline in the price of one input wili cause its employment to rise and
the  employment  of  its  complement  to  rise  as  well.  Similarly,  for  a  multi-output  plant,
complementarity in  production between outputs means that decreasing the price of one output
decreases its  quantity and  the quandty of its  complement holding inputs constant.  Since one
might  reasonably  expect  particular  goods  and  services  to  be  complementary  to  and  not
substitutes  with,  particular  residual  products,  the  general  framework  used  to  characterize
anthropocentric production must  be  sufficiently general  to  encompass both input and  output
subsdtution and complementarity.
It  is important to  note that the concepts of  substitudon and complementarity discussed
above are defined holding something constant, either input levels or output levels.  While it is
useful to  think of the relationships between input and output pairs in  this manner, one should
be  cognizant of  the fact that the analysis of regulatory policies directed toward point sources
must  be  conducted in  a  context  in  which input and output levels  will adjust.  When firms
optimally  adjust  these  levels  in  response  to  regulatory  policies,  the  resulting  relationship
between  input  and  output  pairs  may  be  different  than  the  constrained  relationships  we-7-
normally  have  in  mind when we  think of  substitudon  and complementarity.  We wiU have
more to  say about these relationships when we consider explicit modeling approaches.
1IA  Brownfield and  Greenfield  Plant Designs
It  is  useful  to  distinguish between the  production technology characteristics of  plants
that  are  in  existence  (brownfield)  and  those  that  are  merely  blueprints  for  new  plants
(greenfield).  The degree to which input mixes may be  altered, while holding the output mix
constant,  is  severely limited  in  existing plants.  For example, in  the manufacture of  petro-
chemicals,  the  specification  of  the  products  to  be  produced largely  determines  the  inputs
required.  Moreover, if  the specified outputs  determine the inputs to  be employed, one can
genemlly conclude that the residual products generated are also determined although additional
processes may reduce or transform residual streams.
The  important question to  ask at  this  point is  how environmental policies  based  on
economic incentives can  affect the production of  residuals at brownfield plants.  Take,  for
sake  of  argument, a  tax on  a  polluting input, say  high sulfur coal  used to  generate process
steam.  If there exists  a higher cost,  but available lower sulfur coal that may be  combusted
in  the boilers, a sufficiently high tax on the sulfur content of the coals will induce the plant
to  switch.  However, if  the only altematives are  fuel oil or  natural gas, then the plant must
scrap its brownfield coal fired boilers and install fuel oil or gas boilers.  In this case one can
expect that the tax on coal will need to be  sufficiently high to cause the coal fired boilers to
be  retired and  to cover the added cost of raising the finance to  purchase the new equipment.
In that case, therefore, prices of capital equipment will play a  role, in  addition to  full prices.
In a technical language, the cost function will not  be separable between capital and energy in
this  case.  The point to  note is the dichotomy between a  simple, reversible input substitution,-8-
driven by changing Input prices as compared to a combined scrappage and investment decision
that has  intertemporal  consequences due to  its irreversible nature.
An altemative example of the effect of an  input tax on a brownfield plant would be a
tax on  a  material input, for example, sulfuric acid used to  clean scale from sheet steel prior
to  further processing.  There are subsdtutes for  sulfuric acid, but  few are as effective as the
acid.  The  result of  a  switch to  another cleansing agent will be  a poorer  cleaning job  that
will  degrade  the  quality  of  the final  product.  In this  case the  plant  will  make decisions
based on  competitive market conditions, whether to continue using the acid and pay the tax,
use  a  substitute for the acid and  suffer lost sales, undertake a  capital investment to  recycle
waste  acid, or  discontinue using the  acid altogether and  discontinue producing the  product
dependent upon  acid cleaning.  Each of these decisions will have a different impact on  the
amounts of  residuals generated, the quality of products produced, and the compedtive position
of the plant.  The costs of the chosen response, whether bome by the company or its clients,
or others, should be  included in the measure of  the social cost of the policy change.
Continuing  for  the  moment  with  the  input  tax example,  there  is  a  second  pathway
through which substitution and changes in  residual production can come about in brownfield
plants.  Let us assume that there is more than one brownfield plant producing any  particular
set  of  products,  and  that  the production technologies vary  by  plant  due  perhaps  to  capital
vintage, access to  particular input marrk!,  etc.  Under such assumptions, an inpLt tax, forcing
the plant decisions noted in  the paragraph above, can affect the plant's  competitive position
and lead  to  a  redistribution of output among the  plants.  This  redistribution of output  will
lead  to  altered  aggregate  residual  production  as  well as  the  spatial  distribution  of  these
residuals.X9-
During the  design of  a  new plant all  things are variable, i.e.,  inputs, outputs and
residuals. Since all decisions  are investment  decisions  expectations  about the future economic
environment of  the  plant will be very important.  During this  design stage, the post-
construction flexibility of the plant to modify its input, output and residual mix will be
determined.  Obviously,  environmental  policies based on economic incentives will be most
effective  in greenfield  plant designs  and their effectiveness  will be more pronounced  the more
confidence  the plant designers  have in the stability  of the policies  over time.
m.  A  MODEL  OF  INPUT  DEMAND,  OUTPUT  SUPPLY  AND  RESIDUAL
GENERATION
Given the multiple input, output and residual production  characteristics  of most point
sources, the assumed jointness of  production that we wish to  maintain and the range of
regulatory  policies we intend to consider, the neoclassical  profit function appears to  be the
best conceptual  platform  for our analysis.
Since our goal is to  analyze policies affecting existing plants, and since we might
operationalize our conceptual model using pooled cross  section - time  series data and
econometric estimation techniques, we shall restrict our attention to: (I) the class of profit
functions termed "restricted"  profit functions  indicadng that some subset of the inputs are
quasi-fixed  (e.g., capital), and (2) functional  specifications  lending themselves  to econometric
estimadon.
11.1  The Restricted Profit Function
We shall be assuming that plant  managers have under their control a production-10-
technology that  employs multiple variable inputs to  produce multiple marketed outputs  and
residual products using a  fixed capital stock and perhaps other fixed inputs, subject to  overall
constant returns to  scale. 10 The inputs are assumed to be available at fixed prices and with
constant quality, and the outputs sold at fixed prices in competitive markets. 11 The feasible
set  of variable input, quasi-fixed input, variable output and residual vectors is  represented by
the  set  T,  such  that  (x,  y,  r,  q)eT,  where  x  - (xl,  ...,  xn)  is  an  lxn  row  vector  of  variable
inputs,  y  (y1,  ...,  ym)  is  an  lxm  row  vector  of  marketed  outputs,  r  - (rl,  ...,  rs)  is  a  lxs
row  vector  of  residual  products  and  q  - (ql,  ...,  qk)  is  a  lxk  row  vector  of  quasi-fixed
productive factors.
There  exists  a  fairly  standard  notation  simplification  scheme  that  is  often  used  to
characterize  profit  functions  in  lieu  of  the  scheme  above.  This  simplification  results  in
classifying both  variable inputs and outputs as components of  the x vector, where the first n
components are variable inputs and are negative in sign (suggesting that increases in the price
of  inputs,  all  other  things  constant,  reduces  restricted  profit)  while  the  remaining  m
components are  the  variable outputs  that are  positive in  sign (suggesting  that  increases in
output prices increase restricted profits).
Given this  notational scheme, we might consider incorporating residual products as well
as variable inputs  and marketed outputs into the x vector.  In an  unregulated economy, with
free disposability  of  residuals and holding all else  constant, increases or decreases  in  such
residuals have no effect on  restricted profit.  However, even in an unregulated world, disposal
1011 this characterizadon,  constant  returns  to scale pertains  to proportional  increases  in all factors  of production.
If capital and other inputs are quasi-fixed,  this technology  then exhibits  diminishing  retums to  scale with
respect  to the variable  factors  of production.
11  At this point we are not permitting  a subset of the inputs, namely  the bsogenic  inputs, to be degraded  or
improved  in quality  due to environmental  regulation  or the lack thereof-11-
is  rarely free (sweeping up scraps at the end of  the day costs firms something) _nd thus one
might  imagine  that  increases  in  residuals  would  lower  restricted  profit.  Certainly  in  a
regulated world, where firms using the environment for the disposal of residuals would face
constraints or  would be  charged a  fee, this would be  the case.  Thus, in the case of residuals
fees, variable residuals look  to the restricted profit function like variable inputs, even though
we tend to  think of  them as outputs.  In this  case, taxes or fees on  the release of residuals
drive up the price of disposal  into the environment.  Increasing the cost of disposal induces
firms  to  reduce  their  emissions  by  reducing  the  generation  of  residuals  or  incorporating
treatment  into  their production  activities  in  order  to  transform the  residuals into products
whose release is not taxed (e.g., treated waste water) or is taxed at a lower rate. 12
'Te  prices the  firm faces for its  residuals are interpreted as the prices for disposal to
the  common  environment.  Anything  that  causes  these  prices  to  rise,  causes  the  firm to
reduce its environmental disposal.  One can also  imagine a  set of marketed products that the
firm  can produce by  routing its  residual emissions  from environmental  disposal through  a
recycling activity.  Ceteris paribus (i.e., holding aU prices and quasi-fixed inputs constant), as
the  price  of  this  recycled product increases, residual emissions  and  environmental disposal
decrease.
The plant managers are assumed to face fixed positive prices for variable inputs, outputs
(including  recycled products)  and  the environmental disposal  of  residuals.  These  positive
prices are denoted by  the  lx(n+m+s) row vector p  = (pl'  ...,pn, py,  ...,  pr.  P1 -- psb  The
managers then choose  components of the expanded x vector x  = (xl,  ...,xn, yl,  ... ,  ym,  rl,
...,rd  to maximize profits subject to  the quasi-fixed technology set T.
12 A final techmical  assumption  concems  the  disposability  of the quasi-fixed  inputs  q.  We shall maintain  that if
q'2  q"  and  (x,q')eT, then (x,q'  ')eT.-12-
maxx (px'  (x,q)CT)  =-n(p,q,T).  (1)
The objective function in  (1) is simply the maximization of  variable revenue minus variable
costs as given in (2).
ZpEy - Ep*x -Epfr  (2)
where: i=ln;  j=l,m;  h=l,s
Subject to  the technology T.  The restricted profit function has several mathematical properties
that  we note without discussion.13 nl(p,q,T) is  linearly homogeneous and convex in  p  for
fixed q  and is nondecreasing and concave in q  for fixed p.
The  most  useful  economic  properties  of  lI(p,q,T)  are  its  derivative  properties.  In
particular, the pardal derivatives of nl(p,q,T) with respect to  the vector p  generates the system
of variable input demand equations, the system of output supply equations, and the system of
opdmal (i.e., restricted profit maximization)  residual generation equations. 14 These systems are
displayed below.
13 Readers interested in puring  the technical details further are directed to Diewat  (1985).
14 When one allows for the adjustment  of  both inputs and outputs the deflnitions of input and output substitution
and  complementarity provided in  section  l.3  are no  longer strictly  maintained.  However, one  can  still
examine the  signs of  the respective cross Allen price  elasticities, but  one should be  aware that peamitting
output to adjust in response to either input or  output price changes wiU cause the signs of these easdcities to
be more positive suggesting more complanentarity.-13-
x  = an(px,  pY, pr, q, T)/apx = xx(p,  py, pr, q, T)  (3)
xY  =  an(pX, py, pr  q, T)/apY  =  xY(px,  pY, p,  q, T)
xr  = aIl(pX, py, pr, q, T)apr = xr(px,  py, pr, q, T)
1.2  Modeling Regulatory Policies with the Restricted Profit Function
Using the system (3), one can analyze  three of the four regulatory  policies we wish to
consider by simply altering the components  of the price vector p.  In particular, one can
analyze taxes or  subsidies on: (a) residuals, (b) inputs, and (c) outputs.  For example, a
vector of residuals  taxes equal to tr will lead to altered  levels of input use, output supply  and
residuals  generation  by increasing  the price of residuals  from pr to (pr+tr).  This tax scheme
would appear in the system of input demand  and output supply  equations  as,
x  =  xX(px. 9, pr+e, q, T)  (4)
jiY  =  xy(px,  py,  p1+tF, q.  T
Xr  = xr(px,  py9  pr+tr, q, T).
Similar taxes applied to the input price vector px or the output price vector pY, will lead to
adjustments  in pmflt maximizing  input, output and residuals.-14-
Virtually  any  policy  that  relies  on  economic incentives to  affect  the  firm's  residual
emission activity can be modeled with the restricted profit function.  However, policies of  a
command and control nature, that specify emission limitadons or  the installation of particular
control equipment, are not  modeled as  neatly by the  restricted profit function as they might
be by an engineering process model approach.
To  examine command and  control policies,  let  us first  consider a  policy that  would
force a  firm to  install and operate a particular set of emission abatement or residual treatment
equipment.  Analysis  of  the  policy  will  require  engineering  information  regarding  the
additional  quantities  of  all  factors  of  production  (capital,  labor,  energy  and  purchased
intermediate inputs) that will be required by the reguladon.  We will also require informadon
on the amounts by which each residual's emissions will be  reduced when the above quantides
of producdve factors are employed.
Define AXx as the vector of additional factors of production called for by the regulation
and Axr as  the vector of  reduced emissions.  One can then consider the modified system of
profit maximizing input, output and residuals choices as,
xx =  xx(px, pY, pr, q, T)  + &xX,  (5)
ky = xy(px, py, pr, q, T),
xr = xr(px, pY, pr, q, T) + Axr.-15-
The system (5) can then be  integrated back to obtain the restricted proflt funcdon under the
command and control regulatory  policy. 15
II(p,q,T)  + pX&xK'  +  pru 3xr'  (6)
An emissions limitation policy can be modeled using techniques of simuladon.  Suppose
the policy sets upper limits on the vector of  residuals.  These policy limits are denoted as
Lx'.  Using the system (3), one  searches over the residuals disposal price space pr  for a
vector of disposal prices that would lead to a vector of residuals equal to the policy limits.
It  is important  to note that setting the disposal prices at these shadow values will most likely
lead to  altered input demand and output supplies as well as emission reductions. The ability
of  the  restricted profit function to  track the effect of policies  on the  full range of  firm
decision making Is one of its major advantages.
1.3 Second Derivative Effects: Substitution In the Restricted Profit Function
We have stated above that the flrst partial derivatives of the  restricted profit function
with respect to prices generates the system of input, output and residuals emission equations
by  which one can evaluate a  range of environmental policies.  While this  system of  first
derivatives is most useful for the policy analysis itself, the matrix of second derivatives (the
Hessian) provides the insight behind the adjustments  identified  by the first derivatives.
Let  the  Hessian matrix  denoted  by  V2  rl(p,q,T) with  typical  element a2n(-)/&p2,
indicadng  the change in  the optimal quantity of  the ith variable input, variable marketed
15ThSi  approach  to command  and  control  regulatory  policy  modeling  was  frst intoduced  in Hazilla td Kopp
(1990)  in die context  of a single  output  long-ntm  cost fimction.  In that  parucular  case, concrn  was focused
on the  Increase  in long-nm  production  cost brought  about by the regulatory  policy  and not conerned about
tbe  generation  of  esiduals. In contast,  our curren  effort is more  broad and  les with  residuals  gereradon,
(Footnoe  15  contmued  on folowing  page)-16-
output  or  variable  residual  emission,  due  to  a  change  in  the  jth  variable  input,  variable
marketed output or variable residual emission price.  Multiplying each element of the Hessian
by  the  ratio  of  the  ith  quantity  (i.e.,  variable input, variable  marketed output  or  variable
residual emission) to the jth  price, generates the system of price elasticities denoted rlij  and
presented in table  1.
The elasticity matrix Tlij  contains crucial information  that indicates the range of response
possibilities  the firn  has open  to  it  in  the face of  economic incentive based environmental
quality regulations.  The first  block of the table  (rows xf  ... xn) indicates how the optimal
demands for the  variable factors xl,  ... ,  xn  will change in  a  response to  any  price in  the
model, including charges placed on the residual emissions.  From economic theory we know
that  the  diagonal  elements  (%nij)  will  be  negative,  indicating  that,  ceteris  parib'ts,  a  rise  in  the
price  of  an  input will lower  its  demand.  Input price increases have  both substitution and
output effects.  A  rise in  an input's  price makes it more expensive vis-a-vis other inputs, and
thus  the  firm  will  attempt  to  substitute  away  from the  input  whose  price  has  risen.  In
addition, an input's  price rise will increase the marginal cost  of production, leading the finn
to  lower  rates  of  profit maximizing  output,  implying less  input  demand.  Thus,  both  the
substitution and output effects serve to  reduce the demand for the input whose price rises. 16
output production, input employment, as well as production COSL  The proper modeling of command control
policies in this context depends to great extent on the exact form the policy takes.  The case exemplified by
(5) is quite simplified  and stylistic.  It  assumes that: (1) the policy requires the  installation of a  specific piece
of  equipment that is captured in fixed cost. (2) variable cost of operating the equipment is zero, (3) residual
emissions  are  reduced by a  specific  amount from  the  levels  that would obtain  in  an  uncontrolled, profit
maximizing. short-run equilibrium.  Under these assumptions, the firms marginal cost remains unchanged and
therefore so too does its employment of factors of production (other than the required control capital) and its
outpuL
16 The output effect in  this system is  analogous to the  income effect  in consumer theory.  For  furms' input
demands, however, the output effect wil  always go in the same direction as the substitution  effecL-17-
TABLE  1.  Elasticity  with  respect  to  price  of
Input  Prices  Output  Prices  Residual  Prices
X1,,  X  *^xx  ,  ,i  . xl,,  xr
4  I XI  I  1.1  1m  114+1  114+m  ~~~rl,fn+m+s  rIt,n+m+s
*  I
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Next consider the cross price effects among inputs, e.g.,  the effect that an  increase in
the price of energy can have on the demand for capital.  Once again, there are substitution
and output effects.  If capital and energy were substitutes, an increase in the price of energy
would lower  its  demand and  cause the demand for capital to  rise; however, when there are-18-
more than two  inputs, the relationship between the inputs can be  complementary, indicating
that an increase in  the price of energy can actually bring forth less capital demand rather than
more.  Whether substitution  or complementarity reigns after  the  firm has  fully adjusted its
output as  well as inputs, depends on the strength of  the output effect which, due to increased
marginal cost, decreases input demand when input prices rise.  Given an  increase in energy
prices, if  capital and energy were complements (holding output constant), the output effect on
capital  would  reinforce  the  complementary relationship and  the  sign  of  the  capital-energy
elasticity  would  be  negative (indicating that  an increase in  the price of  energy would drive
down capital  demand).  On the other hand,  if  the  relationship between capital  and  energy
(output  constant)  were  one  of  substitution,  then  the  relative  strength  of  the  opposing
substitution and output effects would determine whether capital demand would rise or fall with
an  increase  in  the price  of  energy.  It  is  important to note  that  unlike  analyses of  factor
demand conducted with  a  cost  function, where one  examines the  relationship among inputs
(substitution and  complementarity) while output is held fixed, the profit function perrnits the
firns  to  adjust output  as  well as  input levels, and thus the  relationships  among inputs are
more complicated than one would find in fixed output models, but  also more realistic.
As one continues to  read across the first block of  rows of the elasticity table, one finds
the elasticities that  indicate how input demand varies in response to changes in  the price of
marketed outputs.  Comer solutions aside (i.e., assuming maximum profit occurs at an interior
point  in  input-output  space),  the signs of  these elasticities  are  positive,  indicating that  an
increase in the price of  an output will induce (due to the output effect) increased demand for
inputs.
The last set of elasticities in the first block of the table are the elasticities that measure
the  responsiveness of  input demand to  changes in  the disposal cost  of  generated residuals.-19-
Suppose one of  the residuals is sulfur dioxide and the input of  interest is sulfur-bearing coal
used to  produce process steam.  If a  tax is placed on the emission of  sulfur from the plant
and  the plant  has  the ability  to  alter  fuel types  on  the  basis of  their  carbon content,  the
elasticity relating a  change in the price of sulfur emissions to  the quantity of high sulfur coal
demanded  will  be  negative  (an  increase  in  the  price  of  sulfur  emissions  will reduce high
sulfur  coal  use).  The  larger  in  absolute value  this  elasticity,  the more  sensitive will  the
demand for high sulfur coal be to taxes on sulfur emissions.  Remember, that the demand for
high  sulfur coal  will decline with a  rise in  sulfur emission taxes due to  both substitution of
low  sulfur  fuels  for  high  sulfur  coal  and  the  tax  induced  increased  marginal  cost  of
production  that  will  decrease  profit  maximizing  output  levels  and  thus  factor  demand.
Extending the example of the  sulfur tax to the  fuel that substitutes for high sulfur coal, the
cross price elasticity between sulfur emission charges and the demand for low sulfur-bearing
fuels  may have either a  positive or negative sign, depending on the relative strengths of the
substitution and output effects.
The  second block of the  elasticity table indicates how the supply of marketed output
varies in  response to price  changes.  With respect to  input price changes, the sign of these
elasticities will be negative (higher input prices will induce lower levels of  output due to  the
output effects).  With respect to  an  output's  own price, the sign  will be  positive (increased
prices bring forth increased supply), while with respect to other output price changes the sign
can be either posidve or negative, depending on the relative strength of the output substitution
effects  (outputs can  be  substitutes or  complements, holding inputs  constant) and the  output
expansion  effect  (jointness  in  production can  cause the  increase  in  inputs  devoted  to  the
production of one output to  reduce the marginal cost of producing a joint output).-20-
The last section of  the second block describes how increased residual disposal cost can
affect the supply of marketed outputs.  In this case, increased disposal cost leads to an output
effect  that  dampens profit maximizing output levels  and one  can  expect to  find  elasticities
with negative signs (but not necessarily for all, when there are several outputs).  The absolute
magnitude of  the elasticities will depend upon the engineering relationship between the output
of interest and the generation of residuals subject to  the tax.
The third block of  the table provides the information necessary to  understand how an
input, output, or residual tax affects the emission of residuals.  Taxes on inputs, outputs and
residuals  all  cause  the  marginal  cost  of  production  to  rise,  dampening  output  and  the
generation  of  residuals.  Thus,  the  output  effect  of  any  tax  on  residuals  generation  is
generally negative. 17 While one  might be inclined to generalize from this statement that the
signs  of  the residual elasticities with  respect to  all  environmental taxes is  negative, it once
again  depends  on  the  relative  strength  of  the  output  effect  vis-a-vis  the  very  complex
engineering  relationships among residuals, input use, and  output  production.  For example,
output effects aside, a tax on sulfur emissions might also decrease nitrogen oxide emissions if
the production technology is  such that these residuals are complements.  In contrast, if  the
firm  responds  to  the  increased  cost  of  sulfur  dioxide  disposal  by  increasing  capital  use
(installing sulfur scrubbers), sulfur emissions may be reduced but  solid waste (scrubber sludge)
might  increase.  If  this  substitution  effect  overpowers  the  output  effect,  the  sign  of  the
elasticity between the tax on sulfur and the emission of solid waste may be  positive.
17 An exception to this general rule would be a  fully nonjoint multiple output production technology,  where one
output is produced using a  'dirty"  input giving rise to a  residual, while the other outputs are produced using
the  sasne capital equipment, but without use of  the dirty input.  If a  tax  were placed on the residual caused
by  the dirty input. the output of  the corresponding  product would be  reduced thus freeing fixed capital.  This
additional  capital could push the short-  nun  marginal cost curve for the other outputs out to the right, causing
their production to expand.-21-
M.4  Evaluating  the  Economic  Impact  of  Environmental  Regulations  on  Point  Sources
Using the Restricted  Profit  Function
The  restricted  profit  function  is  a  very  useful  tool  for  the  comparative  analysis of
a1ternative regulations because  it provides  sectoral estimates of  changes in  output, capacity
udlization (both capital and  labor) energy demand, costs of production, and  welfare theoretic
measures of  the loss  in producer surplus.  The  factor demand and output supply system (3)
provides all the information necessary to evaluate sectoral employment, output and cost effects
given any imposition of environmental taxes, fees, or subsidies.  Searching for a  price vector
pr  that  would  generate  a  residuals emission  vector  Lxr,  by  simulation  of  the  (3),  again
provides the information necessary to evaluate sectoral employment, output and cost effects for
emission  limits;  while  system  (4)  is  used  to  examine command  and  control  technology
regulations.
For each of  the regulatory approaches discussed above, one may integrate the systems
of factor demand, output supply, and  residual emission equations back to  form the restricted
profit function.  Changes in  the levels of  restricted profit are true welfare theoretic measures
of changes in producer surplus and may be combined with changes in household well-being to
measure the relative costs  of  any array of policy  alternatives.  For example, the change in
producer surplus, given a change in residual emissions taxes from plO to  prl  is expressed as,
ApS = n(px,  pY, prl,  q, T)  - nl(px, pY, pr,  q, T).  (7)
The  producer surplus expression  (7) is  defined  for an  individual firmr.  Summing over  all
firms  subject to  the regulation provides  a  measure of  the direct  cost  of  the regulation, but
neglects  the secondary producer surplus changes (general equilibrium effects) that  would be-22-
brought  about  by  the  inter-industry  transfer  of  goods  and  services  from  regulated  to
unregulated industries if  the output prices of the regulated firms rise.
IV.  DATA AVAILABILITY ISSUES
IV.1  Evaluating  the  Adequacy of Data
The purpose of  this closing section is  to  investigate items needed to  operationalize the
restricted profit function model, in  particular, the informational requirements of the modeling
approach.  As  a  stepping  off  point  for  this  discussion  we  should  recognize  that  an
econometric model is constructed for the purpose of  "mapping or  projecting" from one set of
information  to  another  that  is  more  useful  in  the  investigation  and  understanding  of  a
particular economic issue.
For example, if we  wish to  consider the responsiveness of  energy demand to  a  tax on
energy  we  may  wish  to  map  from  observations  on  plant-level  input  choices  and  their
associated prices to  matrices of  input substitution elasticities.  The reliability of the estimated
elasticities (i.e., how well they will approximate actual plant-level response) will depend on
how  well  the  theoretical  model  used  to  characterize  the  elasticities  matches  the  actual
characteristics of  the plant.  If for example, we adopt a  model that assumes all inputs can be
costlessly  adjusted  when  in  fact  energy  using  capital  is  costly  to  adjust,  the  estimated
elasticities may be  unreliable.  Similarly, if  we adopt a  model  that assumes structures and
equipment  may  be  aggregated  into  a  homogenous  index  of  capital  (i.e.  structures  and
equipment form a  weakly separable subset of  the factor inputs) and find out this  assumption
is  untrue, the elasticities estimates will again be  unreliable.  When one  is forced to  assume
costless input adjustment because data on  actual costs of  adjustment are not available, or  one-23-
assumes weak separability because disaggregate structures and equipment data are unavailable,
we refer to the available data as being "inadequate."
It  is  difflcult to  investigate quantitatively data inadequacy, and  therefore, difficult to
state with  any precision the effect of data  Inadequacy on  model results.  Some investigative
experimental work was conducted in the  1980s, but even under experimental conditions, much
of the analysis was qualitative rather than strictly quantitative. 18 Regardless of the quantitative
or  qualitative  character,  investigation of  data  inadequacy begins  with  a  description  of  the
economic issues to  be  addressed and the  modeling framework to  be  employed.  From this
description  one  deternines  the ideal  information set  necessary to  drive  the model (i.e., the
information set  providing a  one-to-one correspondence), and  compares it to  the information
available.
As noted in  the first  section of this  paper, the economic issues to  be investigated are
those  having to  do  with the  policies directed at the control of  point source  pollutants.  In
particular, these policies include:
A.  tariffs on the emission of pollutants,
B.  tariffs  and  subsidies  applied  to  the  inputs  or  the  outputs  of  the  point
source activities under consideration,
C.  limits on  the pollutant emissions themselves, and
D.  directives  regarding  the  installation  of  particular  equipment  and/or  the
alteration in process activities.
To evaluate these policies one needs to  understand:
1.  the  physical  relationships  that  permit  agents  to  transform  energy  and
materials into desired products and residual products,
18  See Kopp  and Smith  (1980a,  1980b,  1982,  1983,  1985),  and Hazilla,  Kopp,  and Smith  (1982)..24-
2.  the choice variables and constraints facing the agents,
3.  the factors motivating the agents' choices, and
4.  the  nature  of  the markets  for  the  energy  and  material  inputs,  and  the
desired residual products (including the distinctions that  serve to define a
residual product from a desired product).
Setting item  1 aside for the moment, items 2-4 involve assumptions.  For example, in  item 2
we  assume  the  agent  makes  choices  over  variable  input  usage,  and  desired  and  residual
product  production.  Agents  do  not  choose  new capital  items.  We also  assume that  the
agents are subject to no constraints other than those imposed by their production technologies
(other constraints may take the form of existing envirornmental  regulation or any other form of
govemmnental  regulation).  In item 3  we assume the agents are motivated solely by the desire
to  maximize  restricted profit,  while in  item 4  we assume the  input and  output markets are
characterized by perfect competition and that desired and residual products are determined on
the basis of their contribution to  restricted profit.
Item  I  is  distinct  from items 2-4  in  the sense that economic theory places  few prior
assumptions on the technology, although we often assume long-run constant returns to scale.19
Instead,  item  I  is  driven by  the  need to  understand the  behavior of  agents under  various
regulatory schemes.  Since this  behavior concenLs the profit maximizing choice of  variable
inputs, desired outputs  and  residuals, subject  to  fixed capital and  the physical relationships
defining  the  technology  of  production,  we  require  information  on  the  agents'  choices  of
variable inputs, desired outputs, residuals, and fixed capital.  Thus, when gathering our "ideal"
19 A few adtional  mathematical  properies  ae  assumed,  but they  are  of trivial  importance  to our task.-25-
information  set,  items  2-4  are  supplied  by  assumption  and  item  1 comes  from  direct
observation.
It  is important to  note that through estimation econometricians  are attempting to gain an
understanding  of  the  physical  relationships  that  permit  agents  to  transform  energy  and
mateiials into desired products and  residual products by examining the agents' choices.  For
this  inference to  be  valid, the physical  relationships must  remain constant across all of  the
econometricians'  observations on  choices, or  the econometrician must  know the manner in
which the relationships have changed.
Observable information on variable inputs, desired outputs, residuals, and  fixed capital
may be evaluated on the basis of several attributes.  For our purposes the following attributes
and questions concerning those attributes are relevant. 20
1.  Attribute:  enumeration  of  the variable inputs,  desired  outputs,  residuals,  and
fixed capital.
Questions:  are  all  the  items  enumerated  or  is  some  class  missing  (e.g.,
residuals), or  some elements of a class missing?
2.  Attribute:  disaggregation of  the variable inputs, desired outputs, residuals, and
fixed capital.
Questions:  is  there  only  aggregate energy  or  are  there  differentiated  types
(electricity, coal, fuel oil, etc.)?  How fine is the differentiation (e.g., high sulfur
versus low sulfur coal)?
3.  Attribute:  number  of  observations  and  the  homogeneity  of  the  structure
generating the observations.
Questions:  are there a  large number of observations on the choices of the same
agents, and  across  these observations has  the production  technology remained
constant?  If  there  are  observations  over  different  agents,  do  they  share  a
common technology?  If  there are observations over  time,  has the technology
changed?  How much variation exists in the data, across observations?
201 am abstracing  from the issue of data information  quality,  i.e, how accurate  is the  infonnation  provided?-26-
Given  the three  attributes above, one  can evaluate any information set,  at least qualitatively,
and determine how well it corresponds to the dictates of  a particular model and the economic
questions to be  asked of  that model.  I consider each of these attributes below in  a  general
way  and  discuss  three  particular  common  forms  of  data:  (1) aggregate  time  series
manufacturing KLEM (K, capital; L,  labor, E,  energy; and M,  intermediate materials) data,
(2) sectoral  time  series  KLEM  data  with  energy  disaggregation,  and  (3) pooled  time
series -cross secdon plant level data.
Enumeration.  Clearly, we would like to  have all the variable inputs, desired outputs,
residuals, and  fixed capital accounted for in  the data, but  this  is  improbable.  The class  of
variables most likely to  be  missing will be  the residuals.  If  all other classes exist, and one
is  willing to  assume that residuals are weakly separable from the other classes, then one may
still  estimate  a  substitution  matrix  for  the  existing  variable  inputs  and  outputs  that  is
meaningful  for  policy  analyses  (more on  separability below).  Of  course,  one  cannot say
anything meaningful about the  residuals, and  thus, if this  information is  totally missing, one
would have no desire to  estimate a substitution matrix for the available inputs and outputs.
However, suppose some information on the substitution among residuals were available
from say a  "nontraditional" source (i.e., not direct observation, but say opinion).  If one could
conjure up the substitution between aggregate residuals and: (1) each of the variable inputs and
outputs,  or  (2) the  aggregate residuals and  aggregate variable inputs  and  aggregate variable
outputs,  one could use  this  information together with the subsdtution matrix estimated from
observed data.  The  drawback to this  approach is that one  cannot examine the substitution
between one of the variable inputs and one of the residuals.  At best one can consider only
the relationship between a  variable input and the aggregate of all residuals.-27-
A similar type of  situation exists if one  is missing information on energy or purchased
intermediate materials.  If  any class is  missing, the appropriateness of  employing data  from
other sources is dependent on the validity of the weak separability assumption noted above.
Aagregation  and  Observations.  Aggregation of different inputs, different outputs and
different  residuals  is justified  if:  (1) Leontief  aggregation conditions hold  (all  items to  be
aggregated  are  in  the  same  quantity  proportions  to  each  other  across  all  observations),
(2) Hicksian aggregation conditions hold (the prices of  all items to  be  aggregated are in the
same proportion to  each other across all observations), or  (3) the items to be aggregated form
a  weakly separable subset of  the  inputs, outputs  and  residuals.  Conditions  I  and  2  rarely
hold, and if they did we would generally be  forced to  aggregate the items due to collinearity
problem6.  The condition of  weak separability is often invoked to justify  aggregation when
aggregation is  desirable.  However, providing evidence to  support the  assumption of  weak
separability usually requires first estimating a  model without aggregation and  then performing
a series of statistical hypotheses tests.  If you could estimate the disaggregate model to begin
with, you probably would not be interested in  aggregating items.
The  upshot  of  the  aggregation  quandary  is  to  keep  the  model  as  disaggregate  as
possible.  However,  detailed  models mean  many parameters  and  thus  require  substantial
quantities of  data.  While the system estimation of (3)  increases the degrees of  freedom by
the addition cf  estimating equations, the data requirements are still large.  We are anticipating
that the functional forms chosen would be  "Diewert flexible," that is,  capable of providing a
second order approximation to  an arbitrary continuously differentiable profit function.  If we
chose such a  functional form and the sum of the vatiable inputs, outputs, residuals, and quasi-
fixed factors were N, we would face the estimation of  1 + N + N(N+I)/2 parameters. 21
21 See Diewen and Wales (1986).-28-
Maintaining  maximum  disaggregation  minimizes  the  need  to  make  separability
assumptions,  but does so at the expense of large data requirements.  While aggregation  does
not eliminate the need to  collect data on all costs incurred and revenues generated by the
plant, it does permit the categories of cost and revenue to be decreased.  Since the cost and
feasibility of any data collection scheme is dependent upon the number of these categories,
the smaller the number, the more likely it is that data will exist or might be collected.  For
example, in  the interest of model integrity, one may wish to  maintain disaggregate capital
inputs,  differentiated by  process; but,  in  reality, capital data  is  usually collected in  two
categories (equipment and structures, and if one is lucky, perhaps electric motors as well).
The issue that must be addressed by the modeler is how much integrity is lost at this higher
level of aggregation.
As  one  proceeds to  greater  levels of  aggregation, one  benefits  from more widely
available  data,  but one  runs the  risk of  compromising the model's  ability to  adequately
characterize the relevant features of the underlying  technology. 22 Ultimately, the decision on
input, output, and residual aggregation  will depend upon the policy questions we expect the
model to address and the range of options the technology presents to the firm as it tries to
respond to the policy.
IV.2  An Engineering Example
An actual example will be helpful.  Suppose we wish to examine policies designed to
reduce the emissions from coking plants employed to  provide coke to  integrated iron  and
steel-making  facilities.  Coking  is  a  process  by  which  metallurgical  coals  of  varying
22 In Kopp and Smith (1980) the issue of input agegation  and the adequacy  of technology  characterization  was
examined in a  controlled experimental setting.  Not surprisingly, Kopp and Smith found that models that
aggregate inputs to very great extent provide very poor characterizations  of  technologies. However, models
that maintained a  level of disaggregation  consistent with the input categories frequently found in U.S. plant
level data, generally  perforned quite welL-29-
characteristics are heated in ovens to  drive off some of  the coal constituents (volatile matter,
water, and sulfur) and produce elemental carbon.  In addition to the production of coke, these
ovens  generate  several  residuals  which  are  discharged  to  the  environment  or  recycled,
depending upon prices for the recycled materials.
The coking process utilizes the inputs of coal and gas to  fire the oven to  produce the
output  coke and  two residual  streams, airbome  particulates and  sulfur,  and  flushing liquor
blowdown. 23 In  addition to coal  and  gas, the coking process requires capital, labor, steam,
electricity, process water, and sulfuric acid.  The airbome particulate.,,  and sulfur are fugitive
emissions  that  are released  at the  time  the oven  is opened  and  tht  coke  "pushed."  The
flushing liquor blowdown comes from  water sprays that are used to  cool and  condense the
coke oven gases  in a  primary cooling process and from the cooling tower blowdown where
the  gases are  further cooled in  a  heat exchanger system.  The  flushing  liquor and  the gas
condensate from the primary cooler are run to a  decanting tank where tar is settled out before
the liquor and  gas  is  returned to  the cooling sprays.  Flushing liquor blowdown results in
about 30 gallons of liquor that are withdrawn from the process for every ton of  coal.  This
liquid  residual product can be  sent  to  environmental discharge, treatment and/or by-product
recovery depending on  market prices and environmental regulation.  Figure  I  describes a  by-
product coking process where coke oven gas flushing liquors are input to by-product recovery
systems producing ammonium sulfate, sulfur, gas to  fire the coke ovens, light oil, and other
chemical compounds. 24
23Blowdown  is a term  used to describe  the liquid  that  is withdrawn  from  these  process  systems  and  replaced
with  make-up  liquids  to keep  the  concentrations  of various  chemicals  within  design  tolerances.
24Figure 1 is a stylized version  of figure  3.1 in Russell  and Vaughan  (1976).  Readers  interested  in a the
engineering  process  approach  to the modeling  of production  activity  and  residuals  generation  are directed  to
this worlk-30-
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Given this very  stylized description of coke production, suppose we wanted to look at
policies to  reduce waterbome emissions.  These emissions are dependent upon the quantity of
coke produced and whether and to  what extent by-product recovery from the flushing liquor is
practiced.  We can  reasonably aggregate over the types of  coal used (C), labor employed (L),
intermediate inputs:  electricity,  steam,  water, sulfuric acid (INTER),  and in-place capital (K).
We  can  aggregate  tar,  breeze,  and  coke into a  single output (TBC);  aggregate ammonium
sulfate,  sulfur,  naphthalene,  forerunnings,  light  oil,  benzene,  toluene,  xylene,  foul  gas,
desulfurized gas, and  sodium phenolate into another output (BY-PROD); and define ammonia
liquor (LIQ) as the residual of  interest.
The profit function would then contain input prices for L, C,  INTER, and the disposal
of  LIQ, output prices for TBC  and BY-PROD, and  the quantity of  K in-place.  The model
would then suggest that the quantity of  LIQ released to  the environment will decrease with
taxes on environmental discharge, taxes on the final products, C and  subsidies to  the sale of
BY-PROD.  If  instead  of  water emissions, we  were concerned with  releases of sulfur,  we
would have to  disaggregate coal by  sulfur content and disaggregate BY-PROD to  break out
sulfur  as a  residual.  The more residuals of concern, the more disaggregate the model must
become.
Unfortunately, it is  not  possible to  state in  any generic way, that  is for  any arbitrary
process  or  set  of  residuals,  the proper  level  of  aggregation.  The  level  of  disaggregation
embodied in any  final model will be based on engineering knowledge of  the technology, the
types of questions the model is designed to address, and the constraints of available data.
Observations,  Homogeneitv  and  Variation.  It  goes  without  saying  that  more
observations  are  preferred  to  fewer  observations and  that  greater  variation  in  the  data  is-32-
preferred to  less.  While these are very  important attributes of  any informadon set, they do
not require a great deal of further discussion.
The  most  serious  issue  in  this  section  concerns heterogeneity  across  the production
technologies  serving  to  generate  the  data.  If  these  observations  are  generated  by  very
different  production  technologies,  one  must  attempt  to  capture  this  heterogeneity  either
parametrically by  using plant specific parameters within a single profit function model, or  by
sub-sampling observations  into  homogenous groups and estimating  separate  profit function
models for each group.  Failing to  perform either a parameterizadon or sub-sampling, at best
leaves  one  with  estimates  of  an  "average"  production  technology.  Using  this  average
technology to  investigate economic issues has some shortcomings which are addressed later.
1V3 Aggregation Over  Productive Units  0
Throughout this paper we have assumed that the appropriate economic agent and unit
for  empirical  analysis  is  the  individual  production  organization  (typically  a  plant).
Consequently, the  important data  and  aggregation issues investigated  using the example of
section IV.2 focused on  the implications of  input aggregation while maintaining the plant as
the unit of observation.  For taxonomy reasons we term this form of data aggregation "within-
plant" aggregation.  In this  current section we wish to consider the case where the available
data may be inconsistent with our maintained view of  the economic agent (i.e., the individual
plant as the unit of  observation) and examine data sets that aggregate over  plants.  We tern
this  type of data problem "across-plant" aggregation.
We consider three  forms of across-plant aggregation that  are consistent with generally
available  data  sets.  For  each  aggregation  we  assume  that  the  same  input  and  output
disaggregation is  available,  that  is,  there exists  three within-plant input aggregates; capital,-33-
labor,  Intermediate  inputs;  a  disaggregate  set  of  energy  inputs  and  a  single  within-plant
aggregate measure of output.  The three categories of plant-level aggregation considered range
from  no  aggregation  to  complete  aggregation  at  the  2-digit  level.  These  categories  are
provided below.
1.  Plant  level  data  observed in  a  pooled time  series-cross  section panel format  (no
across-plant aggregation),
2.  Plants  within  a  single  2-digit  classification  operating  within  a  specific  region,
aggregated each year over some period,
3.  All  plants  within a  single  2-digit classification  aggregated each  year over  some
period.
To  understand  the  implications  of  the  above  across-plant  aggregation  we must  first
identify the nature of  the plant heterogeneity that one might expect. 25 First, within any 2-
digit category, plants wiU likely produce very different products.  For example, within the 2-
digit category "food and kindred products" the U.S. Bureau of the Census identifies over  154
different outputs, ranging from cat  food to orange juice.  These output differences will likely
be  associated with different inputs and different residual products.  Second, even if  the plants
are producing identical products, they wiU be  located in  different areas of the country where
prices for  factor inputs  and taxes levied by local  and  regional political jurisdictions can be
expected  to  be  be  different.  In  addition,  local  regulations,  including  but  not  limited  to
environmental regulations, may also vary.  Differing prices and regulatory regimes will give
rise  to  differences in  input use  and residual products.  Finally, and  again assuming that the
plants  are  producing  the  same  outputs,  the  plants  may  be  using  very  different  vintage
2  We  will assume that each plant is a profit maximizer  unto itself (e.g., a  single plant firm) and that it
competes  in competitive  input  and  output  markets.-34-
technologies, operating very different size plants and operating these plants at  very different
rates of utilization.
As  soon  as one  begins to  aggregate over  plants, one  can expect the  above problems
may arise.  There is no  conceptual difference between the aggregation from category I  to  2,
or  2  to  3, the  same problems can occur, however, the more you aggregate the more severe
one can expect these problems to  be.
Before we consider the implications of aggregadng over plants, let us briefly review the
estimation  of  a  production  model based  on  plant-level  observations.  Once one  chooses  a
sample of plants for estimation one assumes that all the features of the plants not captured by
the model  specification  are: (1) the  same across plants,  (2) unchanging  with  respect to  the
policy, or  (3) uncorrelated with the features included in the model.  If  assumption (1)  holds,
the  estimated model  is  truly  representative of  the  production technology embodied  in  each
plant, since each plant has the same technology, aside from differences captured by the model.
When one  employs  this  estimated  model  in  a  policy  simulation,  one  has  a  high  level  of
confidence  that  actual  plants  will  respond  to  the policy  in  a  manner consistent  with  the
simulation results.  If assumption (1) does not hold, but assumption (2) does, one's  confidence
in  the simulation results depends on the degree to  which the policy in  question may effect
any  of the features held constant across plants during the estimation.  If the policy does not
affect these features, one can again have high confidence in the simulation results.  However,
if  the policy influences these features, the the actual behavior of  the plants will diverge from
the simulation results.  If only assumption (3) holds, the estimated production technology is  a
"composite" of  the heterogeneous technologies that comprise the plant  sample.  If (3) holds,
the composite is unaffected by plant differences not incorporated into the model and one can-35-
have  confidence  that  the  policy  simulation  results  will  generally characterize  actual  plant
behavior.
If  none  of  the  assumptions  above  hold,  the  estimated  model  will  still  represent  a
composite of  the  heterogeneous technologies, but  the  policy simulation may not  adequately
characterize  the  behavior  of  the  actual  plants.  In  this  case  the  policy  will  affect
heterogeneous  plant  attributes  not  captured  by  the  model,  but  which  are  correlated  with
behavior  of  concern  (e.g.,  input  substitution).26 This  set  of  circumstances  will  yield
simulation results quite possibly in conflict with actual plant behavior.  The above discussion
is  meant  to  demonstrate  that  even with  disaggregate  plant-level  data  there exist  potential
modeling  problems.  As  we  discuss  below,  when  these  problems  are  combined  with
aggregation over plants the problems are exacerbated.
Identical  Plants  - Different  Outputs.  We now turn  our  attention  to  across-plant
aggregation and begin the discussion with the hypothetical case of identical plants (i.e., plants
with  identical  production  technologies)  producing  different  outputs.  It  may  stretch  the
imagination somewhat to assume that plants can be identical and yet produce different outputs,
but  there  are  examples  of  multiple  output  plants  that  have  very  high  degrees of  output
substitution and  can produce any of  a number of different products. 27 In this  example we
assume such a  flexible technology exists so that we do not  confound our analysis of output
differences with differences in technology.
If  one  were  estimating  an  econometric  production  model  using  these  data,
assumption  (1)  would  be  satisfied  and  we  would  have high  confidence in  the  simulation
26 This situation  is characterized  as model  misspecification  and is probably  more  the norm than the exception  in
most modeling  exercises.
277The  synthetic  cellulosic  fiber  industry  (SIC 2823) is an example  where  the same plants can produce  nylon,
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results.  However, in this example of across-plant aggregation we now aggregate over some or
all of  these plants, where the quantity of output and the factor inputs within each class (i.e.,
capital, labor, intermediate materials and energy forms) might simply be  summed and indexes
of  input  prices  forrned.  In  this  case  the across-plant  aggregation  can  lead  to  unwanted
problems.
Consider the outputs.  Each plant produces a different  output with a  different market
price.  One accepted and common across-plant aggregation scheme is  to  compute the value
share of each plant in the total value of the output produced by all plants and use the shares
to  weight the individual plant output prices and  compute an aggregate output price."8 One
may  then divide  the output value  aggregate by  the aggregate price  index and  arrive at  an
aggregate output index.  Unfortunately, as  the price of one of  the output's  in  the aggregate
changes (e.g.,  rises) the aggregate output index diverges from the true value (in  the case of
rising  output  price the  aggregate will  fall).  While in  the limit  (i.e.,  for  very  small  price
changes) their  is  no effect  of price  change on  the quantity aggregate, the greater the  price
change, the greater the output aggregate divergence.
Under the  assumption that  these are identical  plants, our  plant  level  observations are
realizations of differing output mixes (i.e., different expansions of  the transformation frontier
in  output space).  I would  assert  without proof  that a  consistent  across-plant aggregate of
these outputs exist  if each plant's  output expansions are linearly homogeneous, and I  would
guess that this might also be true under particular circumstances if  the output expansions were
homothetic.29
28 The econometrician  rarely  knows the exact process  by which aggregate  data was formed. For the purposes  of
dtis paper we will assuime  that a share  weighted  aggregation  is generally  employed.
29 Proving  these results is beyond the scope of this paper  and the interested  reader  is directed  to Diewert  (1976,
1988, 1989) and Blackorby,  Primont  and Russell  (1978).-37-
Differing outputs can  also imply that plants will use different inputs to  produce these
differing outputs.  This  will be m,.st  apparent when examining the individual components of
each  plant's  material  aggregate.  Differing  individual  components  will  lead  to  differing
aggregate  material  price  indexes  and  we  are  thus  left  with  a  situation  in  which  we  are
aggregating across-plants  with  identical  technologies, but  which face  differing  input prices.
This case is discussed in the next secdon.
Plants with differing outputs can likely be characterized by differing input mixes as well
as differing inputs.  For example, the production of one output may be more labor intensive
than  another.  If  these  plants  face  the  same  input  prices,  across-plant  input  quantity
aggregation results in  the simple summation of like inputs, while the aggregate input price is
the common price.  Estimation of  a  production technology based on  these data results in  an
estimated  "composite" single  output  technology that to  some  extent  summarizes the actual
multiple  output  technology  embodied  in  each  of  the disaggregate  plants.  As long  as  the
policy in  question affects all plants equally we can have confidence in the results; however, if
the policy effects the plants producing one of  the outputs differentially, the simulation results
will diverge from actual behavior.
Identical  Plants  - Different  Input  Prices.  We now turn our  attention to aggregation
over plants with the hypothetical case of identical plants facing different input,  prices.  I assert
without proof that if  the plants share a common homothetic technology, across-plant aggregate
price  indexes  formed as  the  weighted sum of  the plant-level  components, will  lead to  an
estimated aggregate  technology  with the  same features as  the  technology  embodied in  the
individual plants.  However, if  the technology is not homothetic there is no single price index
that will ensure the estimated aggregate technology mirrors the plant level technologies.30
30This  assenion is based on within.plant aggregation results contained in Blackorby, Primont and RusseU  (1978),
particulaly section 3.3.-38-
Different  Plants  - Same  Outputs.  Plants producing the same output, but  that embody
different  technologies,  pose  very  serious  problems.  Such  plants  will undoubtedly  utilize
different inputs due to their technologies and could also face differing input prices (that might
have given rise to the choice of the different technologies).  Estimation using this data results
in a composite technology that will be sensitive to policies that affect plants differentially.
Aggregation  Over  Productive  Units  - Summary.  Aggregation over productive units
(plants)  has  two  generic  consequences.  First,  productive  unit  aggregation  involves  the
aggregation of  "like" inputs  and  outputs  across-plants rather than  the  commonly discussed
input and output aggregation that occurs when one  aggregates heterogeneous entities within a
plant  to  form  within-plant aggregates.  If  the plants share  common technologies, then this
across-plant aggregation looks very much like within plant aggregation and perhaps some of
the same theorems pertaining to  the existence and properties of within plant aggregation apply
to  across plant  aggregation.  Second, when plants employ different input mixes or  embody
different  technologies,  across-plant  aggregation  results  in  data  that  give  rise  to  estimated
"composite" technologies. However, as long as  the policies to  be considered affect all  plants
equally (i.e., the plants do not respond to the policy differentially due to  differences in  their
characteristics), the composite technology will adequately reflect aggregate plant behavior.  By
aggregate behavior we mean the general behavior of the industry comprised by the plants, but
not the behavior of any individual plant.
One may attempt to quantify the impact of  the above two aggregation problems on the
performance  of  an  econometric  simulation  models  by  appealing  to  modern  aggregation
theorems,  but  generally one  will  find  these  theorems provide  only  qualitative  results  that
suggest the conditions under which it is  inappropriate to aggregate.  If one  wishes to know
how  much of  an  error  one  is  likely  to  make  by  aggregating  when a  particular  condition-39-
obtains,  one  must  turn  to  experimental  methods.  Unfortunately,  very  little  experimental
evidence exists that deals with across-plant aggregation.
IV.4  Summary  and  Options  for  Dealing with  Data Inadequacies
This  paper  has presented  a  specific modeling framework (termed  a  platform)  for the
analysis of incentive based environmental policies designed to  reduce the emissions from point
sources.  The chosen  platform  is based on  an  econometric restricted profit  function and is
shown to  be  capable of  modeling all the incentive programs normally considered and  a vast
majority of command and control programs as well.
Like any econometric model, the restricted profit function platform contains parameters
that must be  specified and if one desires to maintain significant degrees of within- and across-
plant disaggregation, the restricted profit function possess large number of parameters.  If each
parameter is to  be  econometrically estimated, the restricted profit function platform will be a
voracious user of data.
In previous sections we have investigated some of the possible consequences of  using
aggregate data  to  estimate  the parameters of a  down sized aggregate profit function model.
This  investigation  focused  on  the confidence  one  would  have  in  the  results  of  a  policy
simulation using a  model that  has been aggregated to  match available data.  Based on  this
investigation, it is our general belief that model aggregation, necessitated by data availability,
can  lead  to  serious  problems  and  that more  attention should  be  paid  to  the  prospects  for
augmenting  data  rather  than  aggregating the  model.  In  this  closing  section  we  wish  to
consider this altemative approach.
There  are  at  least  two  options  for  dealing  with  inadequate  data  that  maintain  the
neoclassical  econometric  approach outlined  in  this  paper.  The  first  is  rather obvious  and40-
simply implies adopting an  econometric model that requires less data.  We are not suggesting
that one  abandon the "Diewert flexible" funcdonal forms noted above in  an effort to reduce
the  number  of  parameters  in  the  model  and  thereby  the  required  number  of  degrees  of
freedom.  Rather, we are suggesdng one might consider a  model of  firn  decision making that
economizes on  the kinds of  data required (i.e., various types  of prices and quantities).  The
model we have in  mind is the restricted cost function.
The restricted cost  function model assumes that  plant managers  face fixed prices for
their  inputs  and choose  their  variable inputs  and  residuals so as  to  minimize variable cost,
subject  to  the  existing  technology, quasi-fixed  capital, and  fixed  production rates  for  final
products.
In contrast to  the profit function system (3), the restricted cost  function would contain
only  the factor demand and residual emission equations, while output supply equations would
be  absent.  In such a  framework one could examine command and control technology based
regulations (see Hazilla and  Kopp, 1990); emission fees, permits and  taxes; and input taxes
and subsidies.  However, the fact that outputs are held constant reduces the flexibility of the
technology characterized by the model to  respond to such regulatory schemes through output
adjustments.
While  the  restricted  cost  function  is  the  next  best  modeling  approach  to  the  profit
function, it  economizes only  on  the need for  output prices and  does  so  by sacrificing the
model's ability to  adjust output.  The importance of output adjustment wili depend upon the
technology  and  regulatory  scheme  under  consideration,  but  a  priori  we  would  rather not
exclude  such  adjustment.  Thus,  we  propose  a  second  approach  that  returns  to  the  profit
function framework, but considers the use of informadon that extends beyond the confines of
available econometric data.-41-
In  the  section  of  this  paper  describing  the  second  derivative  properties  of  profit
functions,  we emphasized  the  richness and  usefulness of  the  information contained  in  the
elasdcity  matrix.  Indeed, given this matrix and  observed levels of  actual input use, output
production, residual emissions, and  levels of quasi-fixed capital stocks, we can derive all of
the parameters of  the restricted profit funcdon (analydcally or  numerically depending on the
functional form chosen) without any econometric esdmadon.  One may reasonably ask, even if
we could obtain current data on levels of input use, output producdon, residual emissions, and
quasi-fixed capital stocks, where do we obtain informadon on the elasticity matrix?
The elasticity matrix describes how opdmal  levels of  inputs, outputs and  residuals are
linked to the prices each firm faces for these items.  In a sense, the matrix ;s a composite of
engineering information that describes the technical relations between the items (how one may
be  transformned  into another) and the economic adjustments that the firm makes to  maximize
profit.  As  microeconomists we should note that this information set (the engineering relations
and  the technical  knowledge necessary to  maximize profit)  is  assumed known to  the firm.
Perhaps  this  information  is  not  known  in  the  form  of  the  elasticity  matrix,  but  if  our
underlying  information  assumptions  regarding  neoclassical  producer  behavior  are  at  all
reasonable, the core of the knowledge necessary to  construct the elasticity matrix is known to
firms and individuals familiar with the industry.
This  rather nebulous information we seek is, in  fact, the basis of many process analysis
models constructed for various manufacturing processes.  In fact, since the level of technical
specificity  we  require  to  construct  the elasticity  matrix  is  far  less  than that  necessary to
construct a  process model, one can reasonably expect that the effort required to  assemble the
elasticity information is far less than that required to produce the process model.-42-
In a  series  of papers  in the early  1980s Kopp and  Smith (1980a,  1980b, 1982, 1983,
1985) and  Hazilla,  Kopp, and  Smith (1982),  employed engineering  information, originally
developed to construct process models, to  characterize elasticity matrices and other economic
features  of  production,  such  as  technical  change.  Their  purpose  was  to  compare  this
engineering-based  information,  describing  fundamental  economic  concepts  of  neoclassical
production, with similar information obtained from actual econometric estimation.  While space
does not permit a complete review of this research, suffice it to  say that the results suggested
what  was expected a priori,  but never before proved.  Econometric estimates of  engineering
features of production was found to  reflect reasonably well the physical relationships built into
the  more  detailed  process  models  if  one  does  not  stretch  the  underlying  neoclassical
assumptions too  far.
Given  this  past  experience, we are suggesting that  it is  not  unreasonable to  consider
assembling  engineering  and  plant  management  information  in  an  effort  to  construct  an
elasticity  matrix.  This  information would come from existing industry  studies and  perhaps
models  as  well  as  the  direct  probing  of  experts  (engineers,  plant  managers,  and  those
knowledgeable of  the industry).  In fact, while the work of  Hazilla, Kopp, and Smith drew
from  published  studies,  recent  developments  in  the  construction  of  expert  systems  and
developments by economists and  other social scientists in  the  field of  contingent valuation,
suggest that "expert encoding" may be extremely valuable.
Expanding on our  suggestion to  employ noneconometric data  to  fill  out  an  elasticity
matrix  goes  well  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  however,  we  would  like  to  close  this
section  by  noting  a  few  of  the  benefits  of  such  an  approach.  One  can  argue  that  an
elasticity matrix, derived from actual econometric estimation, using the finest data, is the ideal
modeling tool.  However, one must  also argue that rarely do we have access to such  ideal-43-
tools  and  most  often we  must  perform  analyses with  the best  available  tools.  Recognize
however,  that  we do  have  at  hand  the  platform  for the  ideal  tool, that  is, the  theoretical
concept of the restricted profit function, which given the analyses we wish to  consider, seems
quite ideal indeed.
What we  lack is the quantification of the elasticity matrix.  Suppose we sat down and
"estimated" the elements of  this matrix by simply guessing, and then performed the analyses
we would like to  undertake.  Under such a  scenario, we would assign quite large confidence
intervals  to  the  results  since  we  believe  that  the  probability  distributions  underlying  our
elasticity estimates (guesses) have large variances.  In fact, we might convince ourselves that
the  only  difference between  this  extremely  low  cost  analysis and  the obviously  high  cost
analysis performed with  the fully econometric ideal model, is  the variance of the  elasticity
estimates employed.  For the purposes of policy making, we would have more confidence in
the low  variance  econometric  estimates;  but  other  than the  variance  in  the  estimates,  we
would consider the two analyses absolutely equal.  For a  relatively small expenditure (relative
to  the full econometric approach), we have an  up-and-running policy evaluation model that is
conceptually as solid as current economic thinking permits.
One can now think of  ways that we might begin to improve our confidence in  results
of  the  "guessed"  model.  The  first  thing  to  recognize  is  that,  generally,  any  additional
information will narrow the variance of the results.  Thus, moving from a  guessed matrix to
one  informed by  information found in  the literature or obtained though expert encoding, will
improve our confidence.
Second,  not  all  elasticities  are  equally  important  for  all  policy  analyses.  One  can
imagine a Monte Carlo simulation exercise where a particular policy, say an emission charge,
is  repeatedly  modeled  by  randomly choosing  elasticity  estimates  from  assumed probability-44-
distributions and  designing the experiment around the variances of  these distributions.  The
variance in the simulated policy results is calculated for each elasdcity variance design point.
Comparing the variance of  the policy result with the variance of  each elasdcity will determine
the sensitivity of  the results to  the variance of  the elasticities.  This  information can then be
employed  to  rank  the elasticities  for  the purposes of  research and  direct  research effort to
those elastiities  that are most  crucial to the policy problem under consideration.  The Monte
Carlo  study discussed  above  would provide the  road  map to  actual data  collection  (either
econometric or noneconometric).
We do  not mean to paint the above approach as a panacea, there are surely difficulties
to  be encountered in  implementing the approach and making it operational; but it nevertheless
has desirable attributes, for example: (1)data  inadequacies do not force, as is usually the case.
bastardization of the theoredcal framework, although we often see evidence of  such in applied
literature; (2) a  "best concept" model is available immediately for policy analysis; (3)given any
set  of elasdcities,  counter-factual studies of complex policies can  be  performed, studies too
complex for comparative static  analysis; (4) as  new data and information become available, it
can  be  incorporated  in  the  model;  (5) should econometric  data  be  assembled  years  in  the
future, the modeling framework requires no modification since it is an econometric framework;
and  (6) perhaps most  important, whilc the data  are being improved the  framework is being
udlized, providing insights and educadon to its  users regarding the complexities of  regulation
and economic incentives..45
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